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Jorge Tamames (2020) For the People: Left Populism in Spain and the 
US, Lawrence and Wishart, paperback, pp268, 9781912064441 
There are three sections to this book, each of which contains three chapters, each of 
which begins with three quotations. This is a systematic author. The clear structure 
makes the text easy to navigate and a useful index makes it easier still. The third section 
fulfils the promise of the title, with analyses of the rise and considerable fall of the 
Podemos movement in Spain and Bernie Sanders’ promising but ultimately 
unsuccessful 2020 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in America. 
The second section lays the ground for these two analyses, with accounts of the political 
economies of Spain and America, respectively, over the 35 years or so up to the recent 
financial crash; a major part of the argument of the book is that the current 'populist 
moment' can only be properly understood by locating it in its historical context, which 
dates back to the neoliberal turn of the late 1970s.  
The first section presents Tamames’ view of populism in general, including his 
argument that there can indeed be such a thing as left-wing populism. Populism is, after 
all, more usually viewed as a right-wing phenomenon, a strategy for gaining power by 
means of demagoguery, cynically feeding the resentment of the downtrodden and 
encouraging unfeasible expectations, all with a view to undermining democracy and 
serving the interests of (a section of) the wealthy.  Political parties and movements, 
therefore, usually resist being labelled populist. However, Chantal Mouffe and the late 
Ernesto Laclau have elaborated a theory of populism, which is designed to serve the 
left. Theirs is the guiding theory of Spain’s Podemos movement and the theory to which 
Tamames broadly subscribes. Mouffe herself supplies a Prologue for this book. 
This is an academic text but quite stylishly written. 'Inability to anticipate the future is 
not Polanyi’s only shortcoming,' he writes at one point (p67). Is this a joke? A rather 
subtle half-joke, I think. There is the occasional rhetorical flourish, too. Chapter 1 of 
Section 2, for example, begins by describing the election campaign of a former US 
president which had a populist message reminiscent of that of Donald Trump. Tamames 
asks: 'Who was this charlatan claiming to represent the entirety of his people? Why did 
he attempt to divide society instead of bringing it together?' We’ve probably realised, 
some time before the reveal, that it was Franklin D. Roosevelt but it is none the less 
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effective. This example also serves to illustrate a couple of other features of Tamames’ 
argument about populism. One is that a populist party seeks to define a conflict of 
interest between a corrupt elite and the whole of the rest of society. In the context of 
the Roosevelt example Tamames writes of 'the polarising rhetoric that all populists have 
a weakness for [my emphasis]' but elsewhere he describes polarising rhetoric as a core 
feature of populism. The other is that populism is not an all-or-none attribute: even 
mainstream parties and leaders, like Roosevelt in this example, may on occasion adopt 
a populist approach. 
Mouffe’s work on populism (Mouffe, 2018) is heavily influenced by the writings of 
Antonio Gramsci.  Tamames too, but his historicization of populism owes more to Karl 
Polanyi and also to the work of Peter Mair. I must confess to not having read Polanyi 
and I found the passages in which he applies Polanyian theory in tracing the origins of 
present-day populism to the neoliberal reforms of the 1970s, more difficult than 
anything else in the book. It is easier to understand how the changing relationship, from 
around the 1990s onwards, between national political parties and the peoples they (are 
meant to) serve, as described by Mair (see Mair, 2013), has provoked a populist 
reaction. Among the trends that Mair identifies, one is increasing managerialism, which 
he describes as 'a governing strategy in which decision-making authority is passed over 
to ostensibly non-partisan bodies and in which binding rules are adopted which deny 
discretion to the government of the day' (Mair, 2013, p51).  Another is a loosening of 
the bonds of mutual loyalty between established parties and voters. The former has 
provoked an urge on the part of the people to reassert democratic control while the latter 
has provided the opportunity for new political figures to enter the competition for votes. 
Of course, these two types of historical explanation are compatible: it could be that the 
neoliberal turn in the 1970s shifted the ground so as to make the eruption of populism 
a possibility, while its actual recent eruption was prompted by the political changes 
identified by Mair and others (I use these geophysical terms advisedly because the 
author himself dwells at some length on an analogy with an earthquake, earthquakes 
being long in the making apparently). 
The text of this book is peppered with the word 'democracy' ('democratic', 
'redemocratization', etc.) but its meaning remains uninterrogated.  When a book opens 
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with the sentence: 'Liberal democracy, we are told, is under siege', we are entitled to 
expect more discussion of what this democracy is and of its different forms, at least of 
the differences between Spain’s and America’s democracies. For example, it is notable 
that while Podemos and the Sanders movement both failed to gain victory at the ballot-
box, Podemos, with 13% of the popular vote, is a coalition partner in the current 
Spanish government, something which could not (for good or ill) happen in America. 
Tamames seems to think it sufficient to assert that left-wing populists are aiming for 
more democracy while right-wing ones are aiming for less. However, two of the 
movements that Tamames identifies as left populist have questions of their own to 
answer on this score. He does not mention the Corbynite Labour Party’s response to 
the Brexit vote and he blithely exculpates Syriza from the betrayal of the vote of the 
Greek people against austerity by attributing the entire blame for it to the European 
Union. 
Another thing which leaves me uneasy (about this book and about populist parties) is 
the overwhelming emphasis on ways of appealing to the electorate, rather than 
elaborating a political programme. Podemos is more guilty than the Sanders movement 
in this respect, and it is one of the reasons Podemos seems more stereotypically populist 
than Sanders. An emphasis on electoral appeal at the expense of policy may be a 
defining feature of populism but it is one which left-wing versions of it should surely 
seek to moderate rather than embrace. Yet another reservation I have is that, while 
Tamames points out several times that left populist parties tend to rely on 'culture-sector 
professionals' for their activist support and core vote, he does not discuss it further. It 
deserves proper discussion because it is a feature which, at the moment, distinguishes 
left populism from right populism. It also inevitably influences which policies (insofar 
as there are policies—see above) are promoted. Is it an accident, for example, that 
Sanders promised free higher education in the United States but omitted any 
undertaking on training for skilled manual trades? 
These criticisms are about items which Tamames does not address and which I believe 
any theory of left populism should. What he does address he addresses cogently and 
clearly, and he provides useful analyses of Podemos and the Sanders movement. This 
may reflect my own bias, but I think the latter emerges a bit more favourably than the 
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former. Tamames is complimentary about the organisational networks that the Sanders 
campaign set up and it might well be possible to build on these in a future campaign. 
This would not be headed by Bernie Sanders himself of course, because of his age, but 
perhaps he will turn out to have paved the way for an Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez 
presidency in years to come. Or perhaps not. The future, after all, is difficult to 
anticipate!  
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